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Abstract
Apprenticeship may provide an important opportunity to improve human capital and future earnings of
young people, especially those with low levels of education. Based on new administrative data, we provide
the first empirical evidence of the effect on wages and employability of the mobility across firms and economic
sectors of apprentices after graduation in Italy. We use an instrumental variable approach to account for
endogenous selection that is based on observed and unobserved characteristics when estimating the causal
effects of mobility. Our main finding is that job switchers outside the economic sector of the training
firm faced a considerable gap in wages and weeks worked in comparison to stayers in the training firm,
indicating a loss of firm-specific human capital. In addition, the new apprenticeship introduced by the Biagi
reform, which lessened the stringency of the norms on the training content delivered by firms, resulted in
further reductions of the transferability of skills for trainees relative to the previous regime. Overall, the
apprenticeship contract in Italy generated earning gaps according to the workers’ mobility after graduation,
thus increasing inequality among similar employees.
Keywords: Apprenticeship training, Job mobility, Wages.
JEL classification: J24, J62, J31, J38.
Acknowledgement: The authors wish to thank Fabrizio Patriarca for his helpful and insightful suggestions.
Michele Raitano thanks Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini for the use of the dataset AD-SILC. The usual dis-
claimers apply.
1. Introduction
Over the last decade, there has been a considerable increase in the number of young people unemployed in
several European countries. According to OECD data (OECD, 2018), youth (15-24 years old) unemployment
rates in 2017 were close to 35% in Italy, 39% in Spain, and 44% in Greece. Many young people have responded
to sluggish labour market prospects by withdrawing from education and employment, as indicated by the
share of youth (aged 15 to 29) not in education, employment or training (NEET), which in 2017 reached
20% in Spain and up to 23% in Greece and 25% in Italy (OECD, 2018).
Against this background, apprenticeship has received much attention from policy makers as a means to
improve the opportunities of youth and address skill imbalances in Europe by establishing a better match of
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workers’ skills to firm needs (European Commission, 2017; Pastore, 2017; Ryan, 2001). A growing body of
research has investigated the effectiveness of apprenticeship schemes in European countries as well (Bassanini
et al., 2006; Eichhorst et al., 2015). Specifically, a large corpus of literature explores the individual effect of
apprenticeship on the accumulation and transferability of skills by considering the wage profiles of graduates,
which are expected to reflect higher productivity from training investments, and addressing non-random
selection into apprenticeship and job mobility (Fersterer et al., 2008; Fitzenberger et al., 2015; Go¨ggel and
Zwick, 2012; McIntosh and Morris, 2018).
The existing literature has typically examined the dual apprenticeship system in Germany, which com-
bines state-provided school-based education with firm-provided on-the-job training as a role model (Fitzen-
berger et al., 2015; Korpi and Mertens, 2003; Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009; Rendall and Weiss, 2016),
and has investigated the optimal mix of general and specific skills delivered by alternative training schemes
in terms of the productivity enhancement of workers and returns to human capital that workers are able
to capture (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999a,b; Felli and Harris, 1996; Malcomson et al., 2003; Wasmer,
2006). It has also been argued that regulation enforcing the commitment of firms to training, which is not
verifiable when it takes place within firms, is a key component of successful apprenticeship programmes. In-
deed, since apprenticeship contracts are directly or indirectly subsidised in most cases, enforcement devices
reduce the risk that apprentices are abused as cheap labour or that firms provide training that is too specific
(Dustmann and Scho¨nberg, 2012). In a more general perspective, the structure of incentives shaping the
commitment to high-quality training is the crucial factor to ensure significant returns to graduates who stay
in the training firm and to job switchers (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999b; Leuven, 2005; Ryan et al., 2013).
According to these different strands of studies, whether or not apprenticeship has a payoff for young workers
depends on the design of the scheme, and it is ultimately an empirical question.
This paper adds to the literature on apprenticeship returns by providing a contribution that is novel
in several respects. First, we focus on the Italian case, whose policy relevance is great, given that very
few studies have analysed the effects of apprenticeship in this context. Picchio and Staffolani (2013) use
Italian survey data and investigate if apprenticeship is an effective pathway into permanent jobs, compared
to other forms of temporary work. They find that apprentices are more likely to obtain a permanent job,
especially within the same firm rather than outside, once the apprenticeship period expires. However, this
analysis cannot disentangle the contribution of the specific and general human capital accumulation from
the contribution of the screening hypothesis in determining the empirical findings. Similarly, Bosco and
Valeriani (2018) use a large observational dataset at the employee level and find a weak stepping-stone effect
on permanent jobs for apprenticeship, although again, self-selection issues are at work. Albanese et al. (2017),
Cappellari et al. (2012) and d’Agostino et al. (2018), using administrative data, minimise the problems of
selection and omitted variables bias by estimating the causal effect of changing the apprenticeship contract
features with the so-called Biagi Law on the transition of the apprentices to open-ended contracts and show
a positive impact on job reallocation. Albanese et al. (2017) also find long-term effects of the reform on
apprentices’ wages. This result is consistent with a pattern of higher job stability and is compatible with
the hypothesis of increased human capital accumulation due to the training provisions set by the reform.
This literature does not provide an overall analysis of the impact of apprenticeship on the accumulation of
human capital and the prospective returns of the training investment to former trainees, nor does it directly
address the issue of the selection bias related to idiosyncratic characteristics of young people involved in
training activities, with good-quality workers obtaining better chances after graduation. We contribute to
filling this gap by following the approach proposed by Fitzenberger et al. (2015). In detail, we infer the impact
of training on apprentices’ skills and productivity by estimating the causal effect on wages of job mobility
among prime-aged graduates from apprenticeship in Italy, both within the economic sector of the training
firm and across different economic sectors. We adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach, exploiting
time and regional variation of labour market characteristics to control for selection bias and confounding
factors. Analysing the effect on wages of mobility after graduation allows us to speculate on several issues.
First, when apprenticeship provides firm-specific human capital, we expect that mobility of graduates across
firms involves a loss of the human capital component that is not transferable to the new job and that this
effect translates into in a wage loss. Second, we suppose that the wage gap between stayers (i.e., graduates
who do not switch their job) and job switchers is larger when the apprentice shifts to a job in a different
economic sector. Last, when apprenticeship also provides general human capital, one would expect that
mobility across firms and sectors involves just a small, presumably temporary, wage loss.
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The second novelty of the paper is that we extend the approach of Fitzenberger et al. (2015) and analyse
the pattern of three outcome variables, viz. annual earnings, annual weeks worked and weekly wages. As our
analysis focuses on apprentices transitioning to the status of dependent employees with a permanent contract
in the private sector (controlling for those working on a part-time basis), the outcome variable, ‘weekly wage’,
is a proxy for the hourly wage, which reflects skills and productivity. By examining the behaviour of earnings,
disentangling wage effects that are related to the ‘pure’ training impact from effects related to variations in
work utilisation after placement, we can draw deeper implications under two perspectives, viz. the efficiency
of the training scheme in providing transferable human capital and the equity of the distribution of the gains
from training across firms and former apprentices. For this scope, we use new administrative data, recently
made available, that allow us to observe workers who completed apprenticeship training during the period
1997-2012. We disentangle transitory effects and persistent effects by considering individuals in employment
at least from one year after graduation from apprenticeship and, then, by restricting the sample to those
individuals that we observe in employment at least for the first three years and the first five years after
graduation from apprenticeship.
Finally, building on Albanese et al. (2017), Cappellari et al. (2012) and d’Agostino et al. (2018), we
provide further evidence on the effects of the reform of the apprenticeship regime implemented in Italy by
the Biagi Law, which lessened the stringency of the norms on the training content delivered by firms within
the overhaul of the labour market towards the reduction of employment protection legislation (EPL) ‘at the
margin’. Hence, we contribute to the literature on the differential impact of alternative training schemes of
apprenticeship on the accumulation and transferability of the skills of young workers. This evidence also
sheds new light on the consequences of the progressive deregulation implemented in the Italian labour market
on training and within workers’ earnings inequality4.
Using those who remain working in the training firm (henceforth, the stayers) as the comparison group,
we find that job switchers to a different economic sector faced a considerable gap in both wages and intensity
of work supplied and fared worse than job switchers who remained in the same sector of the training firm,
indicating a loss of firm-specific human capital. In addition, our findings suggest that the arrangements of
the training scheme set by the Biagi reform have significantly weakened the transferability of the skills of
graduates from apprenticeship. Last, when allowing for heterogeneity by firm size, a stark contrast emerges
in the results for small and large firms. The policy implications of the empirical analysis are twofold and
regard both the efficiency and the equity dimensions. On the one hand, the apprenticeship contract in Italy,
overall, has not been effective in generating transferable returns to training for young workers. On the other
hand, as apprenticeship has produced wage gaps and differential work intensity among trained workers with
the same endowment of human capital, the spread of this contract over the last twenty years might have
ultimately contributed to increased inequalities in the labour earnings and working conditions of similar
workers.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 documents some peculiar features of the
youth labour market in Italy. Section 3 describes the dataset, the sample selection and the main variables.
Section 4 discusses the identification and estimation strategy. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical
results and provides some robustness checks. Last, Section 6 states the main conclusions.
2. A first look at the youth labour market
This section documents the institutional background and some key pieces of evidence to motivate our
subsequent empirical analysis. The starting point is that, over the last 30 years, the youth (15-29 years old)
unemployment rate has been a persistent challenge in the Italian labour market. Figure 1 (panel a) sketches
a picture of the unemployment rates by age groups, showing that the unemployment of young people was
more than two times higher than adult unemployment for the analysed time span5. Youth employment
outcomes were considerably aggravated in the wake of the global crisis, which disproportionately affected
the weakest segments of the labour market (Adda and Triggari, 2016). Figure 1 (panel b) also illustrates that
less-educated people were faring worse than people attaining a higher level of education, and the difference in
4 See Bratti et al. (2018) for a detailed discussion of the literature on the impact of EPL on firm-provided training.
5We restrict the analysed time period to the range of 1998-2011 due to the availability of comparable data for all the
contractual typologies in our dataset.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rates by age and education level
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Notes: The low-education group includes workers with primary and secondary education degrees, whereas the high-education group
includes workers with a tertiary education degree. The shares of unemployed in the high- and low-education groups are not constant over
time: the first share ranges in the interval 11-16%, and the second one ranges in the interval 34-44%. Source: AD-SILC longitudinal
dataset.
the rates of unemployment of these two groups increased steadily over time6 As apparent from this evidence,
young people and people with low skills constitute a large part of the structural unemployment problem in
Italy (Bertola and Garibaldi, 2006; Choudhry et al., 2012).
Policy measures that target the young unemployed were introduced in Italy starting from the late 1990s
through an incremental process based on the reduction of EPL for new hires (Cappellari et al., 2012;
d’Agostino et al., 2018)7. The Pacchetto Treu (Law No. 196/1997) gradually expanded the scope for
atypical contracts, and the Biagi Law (Law No. 30/2003) systematically increased the flexibility of the
labour market by introducing new atypical contracts and by relaxing the restrictions on their use.
Within temporary contracts that are involved in the reform process, the two most popular types are
fixed-term and apprenticeship. The fixed-term contract allows firms to hire workers for a period of a definite
duration, but it entails the same amount of social security contributions as an open-ended contract and no
cost saving for the firm (apart from firing costs). In 2001, Law No. 368, based on an EU directive, relieved
employers of being obliged to define specific reasons for using fixed-term contracts and eliminated mandatory
limits to their renewal. Later, Law No. 247/2007 introduced a limit of three years in the maximum duration
of fixed-term contracts stipulated with the same employer. The apprenticeship contract, instead, is one of
the so-called causa mista contracts, which requires the firm to provide the worker with some training while
involving lower social security contributions for the employer to compensate for training costs. Note that the
rationale of both types of temporary contracts is to buffer demand fluctuations, screen workers and favour
the accumulation of work experience in the transition of young people from school to the labour market,
narrowing the experience gap with adults (Vidal and Tigges, 2009). However, the apprenticeship should
also improve the other components of human capital, i.e., general and job-specific skills. In this respect,
the apprenticeship contract is the appropriate measure to address structural issues, such as integrating less-
educated young people into good quality employment and reducing the mismatch between the knowledge
acquired through formal education and the skills required by the labour market.
The regulatory framework for apprenticeship has undergone significant transformations in an attempt to
enhance the proper scope of this contract, which was otherwise frequently used by Italian employers as a
6Data from the Labour Force Survey, provided by the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), show that in 2015, the less-
educated youth unemployment rate reached a peak of approximately 40% and recovered slowly over the following years.
7See d’Agostino et al. (2018) for a detailed discussion on the evolution of these policy measures.
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Figure 2: Youth (15-29 years old) employment shares of new entrants by contract type and education level
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tertiary education degree. The shares of unemployed in the high- and low-education groups are not constant over time: the first share ranges in the interval
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form of cheap and temporary labour supply (Albanese et al., 2017; Bardazzi and Duranti, 2016; ISFOL, 2010;
Steedman, 2012). The Pacchetto Treu revised the apprenticeship by applying the contract to young workers
aged 16-26 years for a duration between eighteen months and four years,and by requiring that training
ensured by the employer consisted of a theoretical part, which had to take place outside the firm by means
of complementary courses, and a practical, firm-based training provided during the work time. Note that
the content of the external training was defined by the regional authorities and the collective agreements.
In addition, the external training could only be provided by accredited institutes sponsored by regions and
had to be no less than 120 hours per year (Albanese et al., 2017). Interestingly, this scheme guaranteed
some benefits to the employer, implying a lower labour cost to compensate for the external, formal training,
such as a reduction in apprentices’ payroll taxes. The worker also contributed to training expenses by taking
a wage lower than the wage floor defined by collective bargaining agreements. In addition, the Pacchetto
Treu made provisions for monitoring activities, assigned to specific supervisory bodies, over the required
training and the formal education outside the workplace. Last, at the end of the training period, apprentices
received a certificate for the qualification they had attained. Despite the limitations to compliance with
compulsory training obligations by firms (Cappellari et al., 2012), formal training and monitoring represented
a commitment device for obliging firms in delivering training, whereas the certification provided a mechanism
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for recognition of workers’ occupational skills.
The apprenticeship was then reshaped by the Biagi Law, aiming to stimulate the use of this contract.
This target was pursued by several innovations, such as extending the applicability to young people up to
age 29 and increasing the contract’s duration to a maximum of six years. With respect to the training
provision, on the one hand, the reform introduced various types of training, also linked to higher education
or university education8, and stated that the employer must define the qualification that the worker will
acquire during the apprenticeship period and must accordingly provide her/him with training. On the other
hand, the reform abolished the certificate of qualifications signed by external authorities and allowed firms
to undergo training in the workplace as a substitute for external training courses providing general skills,
thus reducing the cost of apprenticeship for firms. With these amendments, it became even more difficult
to monitor firms’ compliance with the training obligations and to promote the formation of general human
capital. The liberalisation of training was coupled with the introduction of a minimum floor to apprentices’
wages, stipulated in collective bargaining agreements, to compensate apprentices for the removal of the
investment in external training by firms (Tiraboschi, 2012). In addition, the firm’s hiring cost of apprentices
was subsidised through the guarantee to the employer of some benefits from rebates in apprentices’ payroll
taxes. Furthermore, according to the reform, apprentices could be hired at a lower level of professional
classification with respect to regular workers performing the same tasks, implying a ‘de facto’ lower wage
with respect to the standard.
Figure 2 (panel a) charts the evolution of the employment shares of young (aged 15-29 years) labour mar-
ket entrants (never employed) in the private sector from the start of the liberalisation of atypical contracts,
encompassing the four major contractual typologies of dependent employment. The figure highlights that
the use of non-standard contracts has become widespread and that fixed-term and apprenticeship contracts
have acquired the most relevant share of entrants in dependent employment for the young workforce in Italy.
The share of fixed-term contracts in total dependent employment, in particular, followed a rise after the Biagi
Law, when a corresponding decrease in new hiring through permanent contracts occurred. The remaining
panels of the figure replicate the previous graph by distinguishing between high- and low-educated young
workers. Figure 2 (panel b) shows that before the introduction of the Biagi Law, the apprenticeship contract
was the main instrument to hire less-educated workers, whereas afterwards, the relevance of the fixed-term
contract sharply increased. Figure 2 (panel c) sketches a somewhat different pattern for higher-educated
workers: at the beginning of the analysed period, these workers mainly entered the labour market with a
permanent or a fixed-term job, whereas over the years, fixed-term contracts followed an upward trend and
gradually became prevalent.
Clearly, Figure 2 indicates that after the liberalisation that created flexibility ‘at the margin’, employers
have generally preferred to hire workers on fixed-term contracts, suggesting that this arrangement was
perceived as the most convenient within temporary jobs. According to Bratti et al. (2018), the excessive
use of temporary contracts and the short duration of employment spells reduced the incentives for firms to
provide training. A complementary explanation is that firms reacted to the unstable economic environment
in the late 2000s by increasing fixed-term contracts and reducing apprenticeship contracts, as the training
investment would be lost upon the worker’s dismissal (Devicienti et al., 2018). Moreover, in a context
characterised by high volatility and low long-term investments, it becomes less important for firms to invest
in human capital and to use apprenticeship, which emphasises screening through training, to assess workers’
quality before getting locked in an open-ended job relationship.
The increased heterogeneity of contractual arrangements in Italy contributed to the rise in earnings
inequality among private employees since the end of the 90s and especially after 2006 (Figure 3). Interestingly,
in contrast with the common idea that an increase in earnings inequality is mainly due to the worsening
economic conditions of young workers compared to the elderly, a further steeper rise in the Gini index of
annual earnings and weekly wages emerges when we consider workers aged 15-29 years, showing that the
process of deregulation of the Italian labour market was associated with a dramatic increase in ‘within
younger workers’ inequalities’. Therefore, the mobility pattern experienced after the apprenticeship period
8The Biagi Law defines three different types of apprenticeships: the vocational apprenticeship, which is largely the most
used typology, the apprenticeship for the completion of the right and the duty of education and training, and the apprenticeship
aimed at the acquisition of a second-level qualification or tertiary degree.
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Figure 3: Gini index of annual gross earnings inequality among private employees
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might have been a possible driver of this within-group inequality.
3. Data
We use the AD-SILC longitudinal dataset, constructed by merging cross-sectional waves from 2004-2012
of IT-SILC (i.e., the Italian component of the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions,
EU-SILC), and the administrative longitudinal records provided by the Italian National Social Security
Institute (INPS), which track employment and earnings histories of all individuals working in Italy from the
moment they entered the labour market up to the end of 20139. In detail, cross-sectional variables collected
in IT-SILC concerning all individuals interviewed in the various waves of IT-SILC have been enriched by
longitudinal social security records since the entry into the labour market. Social security records offer a
comprehensive picture of the careers of all types of Italian workers (both employees and self-employed),
as they report on a yearly basis and for each working relationship the gross earnings (including overtime,
personal income taxes and social insurance contributions paid by the workers), the working weeks, and
the type of working relationship (i.e., public or private employment and the various categories of self-
employment, which are exactly distinguished in INPS archives according to the pension fund where the
workers pay pension contributions). Therefore, INPS data allow us to perfectly reconstruct year-by-year the
effective labour market experience (in weeks) since the entry into activity or into each working arrangement
and the weekly wages (computed by dividing total annual earnings by the corresponding number of worked
weeks).
For employees in the private sector, INPS data also record the occupation—distinguishing apprentices,
blue-collar workers, white-collar workers and managers—together with the contractual arrangement (full-
time versus part-time and fixed-term versus open-ended), dummies when the worker received allowances for
maternity, sickness or temporary job suspension (the so-called Cassa Integrazione allowance), the region of
work and some firm’s characteristics, namely, the firm code (which allows us to distinguish those who remain
in the same firm after the apprenticeship from those who move), the size, the typology (i.e., single firm,
leader or follower in a holding) and the industry (coded at the 2-digit NACE level).
Therefore, the AD-SILC dataset couples very detailed information on working histories obtained from
social security archives with information on workers’ characteristics (gender, age, education, and citizenship)
recorded in IT-SILC. Moreover, being based on an administrative source, AD-SILC data are not affected by
measurement errors about earnings, worked weeks and the type of contractual arrangement or by memory
bias; this is particularly important when studying employment trajectories. For the aim of this article, we
9We used individual fiscal codes as the matching key.
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extracted from this very large dataset (including approximately 4.5 million observations) the longitudinal
subsample of those individuals who started to work as an apprentice in the period 1997-2012, followed on a
yearly basis up to the last year of observation 10. We excluded from the sample individuals without Italian
citizenship because the retrospective AD-SILC panel has under-represented immigrants in past years.
We aim at inquiring the returns from apprenticeship for those who remained in the firm where they
graduated, compared to those who moved after the apprenticeship period to another firm in the same
sector or across economic sectors. Since the economic sector is only defined for private employees in INPS
data and we want to focus on individuals working as an employee, we dropped workers who moved after
the apprenticeship to self-employment or public employment. Finally, since we are interested in analysing
returns from apprenticeship for those who move towards a standard occupation, we only considered workers
who achieve an open-ended arrangement. Our final sample thus includes 2,804 individuals (1,548 males and
1,256 females) who started to work as an apprentice in 1997 or after and then moved to an open-ended
arrangement as a private employee. As expected, our sample is mainly composed of low- and medium-skilled
workers; moreover, even if the share of high-skilled workers is not negligible, the shares of individuals with
at most a lower secondary, an upper secondary or a tertiary degree are, indeed, 32.7%, 55.3%, and 12.0%,
respectively (see Appendix A).
We consider three dependent variables in our analyses: the log of gross annual earnings from employment
in the private sector, the log of gross weekly wages, and the log of annual weeks worked, where wages and
earnings are taken in real terms (nominal values are converted to real values by using CPIs). We consider
three dependent variables since they summarise different individuals’ outcomes in the labour market: i)
‘weekly wages’ can be considered the main proxy of a worker’s productivity (hourly wages are not available
in INPS archives, but we control for the full- versus part-time arrangement in all regressions); ii) ‘weeks
worked’ is an indicator of a worker’s employability; and iii) ‘annual earnings’ is a variable affected by the
two previous dimensions and expresses the worker’s socio-economic condition in a year.
Our main independent variable is the type of mobility from apprenticeship to the open-ended employment
arrangement in the private sector: indeed, we distinguish those who remain in the same firm where they
worked as an apprentice from those who switched to a different firm in the same NACE 2-digit industry or
to a different industry.
The richness of our dataset allows us to include dozens of covariates in our regressions and to compute
(from the full AD-SILC dataset) the instrumental variables we implement. In more detail, in all estimates,
we control for the following covariates: individual socio-demographic characteristics (i.e., age, gender, and
education), features of the working relationship (i.e., occupation, dummies for part-time workers, dummies for
those who spent the longest period in a year receiving maternity, and sickness or job suspension allowances),
information about the duration in weeks of the experience as an apprentice, the firm’s characteristics that
capture some factors related to their productivity (i.e., size and type), and the region of work, year fixed
effects and dummies for the year of entry into activity as an open-ended employee in the private sector
(Appendix A).
individuals in employment at least from one year after graduation from apprenticeship and, then, by
restricting the sample to those individuals that we observe at least for the first three years and the first five
years in employment after graduation from apprenticeship.
4. Empirical strategy
4.1. Identification and estimation
To explore different aspects of the human capital formation and career development of apprentices, we
consider three outcome variables, viz., annual earnings, annual weeks worked and weekly wages. We compare
the outcomes’ patterns of stayers with those of job switchers across firms in the same sector and in different
economic sectors to infer the impact of training on apprentices’ skills and productivity. We estimate pooled
10To take advantage of the less restricted dimension of the panel, we used the unbalanced panel 1997-2012 to estimate the
effects of apprenticeship for individuals in employment at least from one year after graduation from apprenticeship and, then, for
individuals observed in employment at least for the first three years and the first five years after graduation from apprenticeship.
As a check, we ran the estimates for the balanced panel 1997-2008, and we obtained statistically equivalent results. This analysis
is available upon request.
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regressions for the selected outcome variables and consider individuals in employment at least from one year
after graduation from apprenticeship and, then, individuals that we observe in employment at least for the
first three years and the first five years after graduation from apprenticeship.
For a given outcome variable yit, the regression is expressed as follows:
yit = β0 + β1job swi + β2Xit + β3Z¯ia + γ1ygi + γ2regi + γ4yeart + ωit (1)
where the dummy variable, job swi, describes job mobility after graduation, Xit is the set of control variables
characterising the apprentice after graduation as described in Section 3, Z¯ia is a set of controls averaged
over the entire length of the apprenticeship, and a is the length of the apprenticeship period (a = 1, ..., A).
All the specifications include the year of graduation, ygi, the regional dummies, regi and the calendar year,
yeart.
Several contributions highlight potential negative selection effects in the mobility of the graduate from
apprenticeship (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Fitzenberger et al., 2015). During apprenticeship, firms may
screen the ability of workers and may choose to retain the most productive after graduation. To solve the
bias due to the selection into job mobility, an instrumental variable (IV) approach is applied, exploiting
variation in the local labour market characteristics in the year of graduation and over time.
Considering that our endogenous variables are binary variables, in the first stage, we run separate probit
regressions for each Italian region, in line with Angrist (2001); Wooldridge (2010); Fitzenberger et al. (2015).
Specifically, we run the following auxiliary regression to estimate the probability of mobility Pˆ rit for the region
r (r = 1..., R):
Pˆ rit = α0 + α1IVpt + α2Xit + α3Zia + µit (2)
where IVpt is the set of instruments for mobility, which vary at the provincial level (where p = 1, ...., P and P
indicates the Italian provinces). The sum of these probabilities (Pˆit =
∑R
r=1 Pˆ
r
it ) is the excluded instrument
for the endogenous mobility dummy that we use in second-stage regressions. The two-stage procedure allows
us to rely on the usual generalised method of moments (GMM) standard errors and test statistics and to
run estimates that are robust against misspecification in the probit model (Wooldridge, 2010).
Table 1: Main instrumental variables
Mean S.d.
Unemployment rate 0.131 0.060
Sectoral mobility rates 0.445 0.055
Exit into unemployment 0.080 0.047
Youth unemployment rate 0.216 0.079
Share of high-educated workers 0.108 0.048
Share of low-educated workers 0.310 0.086
Table 1 reports a description of the instruments set, along with the mean and standard deviation of each
variable (values of the instrumental variables are taken from the AD-SILC dataset). Following Fitzenberger
et al. (2015), we use the unemployment rate to account for the business cycle in general. Sectoral mobility
rates and exit into unemployment risk are also used as proxies for further local market characteristics that
may affect the mobility of graduates from apprenticeship. Finally, the youth unemployment rate and the
shares of high-educated and low-educated workers are introduced, respectively, to account for specific labour
market characteristics that are relevant to apprentices who are displaced from their training firm and to
capture the educational background of the local workforce.
4.2. Heterogeneity
During the analysed time period, we observe apprentices treated by two different regimes. As discussed
in Section 2, a major policy change occurred in 2003, i.e., the Biagi Law, which revised the apprenticeship
regime formerly introduced by the Pacchetto Treu. In particular, the reform acted on the content of the
apprenticeship by allowing firms to remove the component related to general skills; therefore, when investi-
gating the heterogeneous mobility effects under the two regimes, we can infer the effect on the apprentices’
prospects of a scheme based on general and specific training (the old apprenticeship) versus a scheme based
only on specific training (the new apprenticeship).
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To identify the policy change, we extend the identification originally proposed by Cappellari et al. (2012);
d’Agostino et al. (2018), which exploits the gradual application process of the reform, generating indepen-
dent random events that had no spillover effects on non-adopting regions and sectors. In more detail, the
apprenticeship reform required specific regulations to be issued by each Italian region. This process was
slow, and in 2005, the government stated that in the absence of regional regulations, collective agreements
at the sectoral level could specify the training content of the contract. This produced two tracks before the
new apprenticeship contract could be adopted: one covering regional guidelines and the other implemented
by sector-specific collective agreements11. We use this identification structure to generate a sample of grad-
uates who during their apprenticeship, were treated by the Biagi Law and experienced the new training
scheme. Furthermore, as the introduction of the new apprenticeship is an independent event with respect to
productive sectors and regions implementing the contract (Cappellari et al., 2012; d’Agostino et al., 2018),
we can extend the procedure proposed by Wooldridge (2010) and estimate the following equation:
yit = δ0 + δ1job swi + δ1(job swi × biagiia) + δ2Xit (3)
+ δ3Zia + γ1ygi + γ2regi + γ3sectori + γ4yeart + φit
where biagiia is a dummy variable that represents whether the employee was treated by the Biagi Law
during apprenticeship. To estimate equation 3, in line with Fitzenberger et al. (2015), we introduce one
more instrument that is obtained by the interaction between the original instrument and the dummy variable
biagiia
12.
5. Results
5.1. IV estimates
Table 2 to 4 displays the results obtained by the IV estimation for annual earnings, annual weeks worked
and weekly wages. In Appendix B, we report the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. Each table is
organised horizontally in three blocks. The first block reports the estimates for the full sample including all
job switchers, whereas the second and the third block report, respectively, the estimates for job switchers
within the same sector of the training firm and job switchers across other economic sectors. The group of
the stayers serves as a comparison throughout the econometric analysis. Each table is organised vertically in
three blocks that report the estimation results for the selected outcome variable and consider the individuals
at least in the first year of employment after graduation from apprenticeship (1 yr.) and, then, the individuals
that we observe, at least, for the first three years (3 yr.) and the first five years (5 yr.) in employment after
graduation from apprenticeship.
At the bottom of each block, first-stage weak-instrument test statistics are reported. These statistics,
in a one-endogenous variable model, reduce to the standard non-robust (Cragg-Donald F test statistic) and
the heteroskedasticity-robust first-stage F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic). As shown in the three
tables, the strength of the instruments is confirmed across all the proposed specifications according to the
usual criterion that the F-statistic on the excluded instruments in the first stage is greater than 10.
The results from Table 2 show that the loss in annual earnings when apprentices switch jobs, in comparison
to stayers, amounts to approximately 15.5%, and it is persistent over time. Underlying the tenure premium
on earnings for workers staying with their initial employer, two sources of change are at play: a 10% loss in
the annual weeks of work (see Table 3) and a loss of approximately 6% in weekly wages (see Table 4).
Moving to the second horizontal block of the three tables, no significant difference emerges comparing
stayers to job switchers within the same sector of the training firm in terms of annual earnings and weekly
11The first regulations were introduced in Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany in 2005, followed by Friuli, Marche, Sardinia and the
autonomous province of Bolzano in 2006, and finally by Lazio in 2007. Other regions (Piedmont, Lombardy, Umbria, Abruzzo,
Campania, Veneto, Liguria, and Marche) introduced experimental regulations only in some sectors. Moreover, sector-specific
collective agreements were introduced in textiles, wood products, chemicals, construction, transportation, retail trade and
food products, whose collective agreements were signed in 2005, while metal manufacturing and telecommunication reached
agreements in 2006, and tourism and private insurance followed in 2007 (ISFOL, 2010).
12As shown by Wooldridge (2010), this new instrument, obtained by interacting the original instrument and an exogenous
variable, is still a good instrument.
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Table 2: IV estimates, annual earnings
1 yr. 3 yr. 5 yr.
Full sample
Job switch -0.155 *** -0.149 *** -0.169 ***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 3057.006 3013.652 2823.400
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 525.167 621.170 652.504
No. of observations 13,164 12,704 11,549
Within-sector sample
Job switch -0.080 -0.076 -0.120 *
(0.051) (0.049) (0.058)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 1491.145 1446.987 1313.693
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 319.587 361.365 371.225
No. of observations 8,041 7,644 6,764
Across-sectors sample
Job switch -0.207 *** -0.188 *** -0.206 ***
(0.047) (0.042) (0.040)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 2478.024 2461.052 2301.396
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 454.701 608.155 571.690
No. of observations 10,990 10,601 9,613
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. The asterisks stand for the p-
value significance levels (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). The sum of the observations
used in the within-sector sample and in the across-sectors sample are not equal to the sum
of the observations used for the full-sample analysis, since the information on the stayers in
the same firm after graduation is repeated across the sub-samples.
wages. Conversely, graduates from apprenticeship who leave the initial firm, in this case, experience a
significant loss of approximately 9% in the annual weeks worked. This result indicates that training has a
positive effect on general skills and productivity of apprentices since they do not suffer a wage loss when
quitting the firm. In regard to working time, we argue that the result reveals a decrease in the work time
for job switchers caused by labour market frictions, such as informational asymmetries, that make moving
to a new firm costly for the trained worker (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999b; Leuven, 2005). Indeed, to
ascertain whether a worker actually possesses general skills or in what amount or quality, the new employer
might only gradually involve the worker in the productive process of the firm. However, we also find that
the loss in work activity of within-sector switchers does not fade when we restrict the sample by considering
different periods in employment after graduation from apprenticeship. Therefore, the gap in working weeks
may be persistent, tending to lessen the potential positive impact of apprenticeship on future returns from
training, even in the case of job switchers within the sector where the apprenticeship was performed.
It is worthwhile to highlight a last remark. As we do not find significant differences in wages and earnings
between stayers and within-sector switchers, we conjecture that these workers might be used more intensively
in the new job through a working-time reduction and a parallel extension of the operational working hours
compared to stayers. This setting could represent an efficient solution to overcome information asymmetries,
as former apprentices would recoup the gain to training through working overtime (Hart and Ma, 2010), but
this practice could also harm job switchers (Pencavel, 2016). We cannot validate this argument with our
empirical analysis, but it is instructive to contemplate this possible consequence of mobility.
In contrast, the mobility of graduates to jobs in other economic sectors implies sizeable income disparities
compared to stayers. As outlined in the last horizontal block of the three tables, switchers across economic
sectors suffer a loss in annual earnings of approximately 21% (Table 2) and a negative gap in both weeks
worked (-13%, see Table 3) and weekly wages (approximately -8%, see Table 4). The poor performance of
graduates moving across sectors under dimensions of both pay and utilisation in the new firms suggests that
general skills are not a sufficient component of the apprenticeship programme in Italy; thus, the training
content does not provide benefits that can be fully reaped by apprentices later, during the tenure in another
firm. In addition, all these effects are persistent, indicating that the loss suffered by job switchers may be
long-lasting or even permanent. Therefore, this early labour market event might have large effects on workers
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Table 3: IV estimates, annual weeks worked
1 yr. 3 yr. 5 yr.
Full sample
Job switch -0.101 *** -0.096 *** -0.103 ***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 3059.879 3015.009 2822.150
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 525.307 620.219 652.410
No. of observations 13,153 12,694 11,545
Within-sector sample
Job switch -0.089 *** -0.082 ** -0.099 ***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 1492.871 1448.795 1313.405
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 318.913 361.043 371.132
No. of observations 8,035 7,638 6,763
Across-sectors sample
Job switch -0.131 *** -0.118 *** -0.127 ***
(0.031) (0.028) (0.027)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 2482.299 2463.122 2300.792
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 454.927 607.763 571.696
No. of observations 10,981 10,593 9,610
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. The asterisks stand for the p-
value significance levels (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). The sum of the observations
used in the within-sector sample and in the across-sectors sample are not equal to the sum
of the observations used for the full-sample analysis, since the information on the stayers in
the same firm after graduation is repeated across the sub-samples.
Table 4: IV estimates, weekly wages
1 yr. 3 yr. 5 yr.
Full sample
Job switch -0.055 *** -0.054 *** -0.066 ***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 3059.879 3015.009 2822.150
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 525.307 620.219 652.410
No. of observations 13,153 12,694 11,545
Within-sector sample
Job switch 0.005 0.002 -0.019
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 1492.871 1448.795 1313.405
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 318.913 361.043 371.132
No. of observations 8,035 7,638 6,763
Across-sectors sample
Job switch -0.077 *** -0.070 *** -0.080 ***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 2482.299 2463.122 2300.792
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 454.927 607.763 571.696
No. of observations 10,981 10,593 9,610
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. The asterisks stand for the p-
value significance levels (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). The sum of the observations
used in the within-sector sample and in the across-sectors sample are not equal to the sum
of the observations used for the full-sample analysis, since the information on the stayers in
the same firm after graduation is repeated across the sub-samples.
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lifetime earnings (von Wachter and Bender, 2006).
In summary, this analysis shows that the apprenticeship contract in Italy has had only a slight positive
effect on the transferability of the returns to training for young workers. Indeed, we always find a persistent
tenure premium for workers staying with their training firm compared to job switchers. The asymmetrical
gains accruing to stayers in comparison to job switchers also point out that the spread of the apprenticeship
contract in the Italian firms over the last twenty years has contributed to the increase of disparities in wage
profiles and work times of young workers who are supposed to be similar in terms of ability and skills, thus
raising inequalities in labour earnings and working conditions.
Finally, it is noteworthy that when we compare these results with the OLS estimates (see Appendix B),
we find that the negative effects related to job mobility are generally more pronounced in the IV estimates,
suggesting a positive selection bias for stayers in the training firm.
5.2. Heterogeneous effects: the Biagi reform
In Section 2 and 4, we have discussed the major changes in the apprenticeship contract introduced by
the Biagi Law. In this section, we assess the heterogeneous effects of mobility produced by the different
treatment for graduates with the old Pacchetto Treu apprenticeship scheme and graduates with the new
Biagi Law scheme. We expect that staying in the same job should be more rewarding than switching jobs
when training is highly firm specific, as under the new apprenticeship regime introduced by the Biagi Law,
whereas variations in wages, in relative terms, should be minor when general training is a component of
apprenticeship, and thus, graduates have accumulated skills that are in part transferable, as in the case of
the old Pacchetto Treu regime.
Table 5: Difference-in-Differences estimates
Annual earnings Annual weeks worked Weekly wages
Full Within-sector Across-sectors Full Within-sector Across-sectors Full Within-sector Across-sectors
sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample
ATE -0.007 -0.002 -0.010 -0.093 *** -0.089 *** -0.096 *** 0.085 *** 0.086 *** 0.084 ***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Potential outcome 9.004 *** 9.001 *** 9.002 *** 3.473 *** 3.472 *** 3.473 *** 5.532 *** 5.531 *** 5.531 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
No. of observations 9322 9098 9205 9321 9097 9204 9320 9096 9203
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. The asterisks stand for the p-value significance levels (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). The sum of
the observations used in the within-sector sample and in the across-sectors sample are not equal to the sum of the observations used for the full-sample analysis, since the
information on the stayers in the same firm after graduation is repeated across the sub-samples.
To explore this issue, we first need to check whether any significant difference in the outcome variables
for apprentices emerged before graduation under the two schemes. More specifically, potential variations in
the effects of mobility might be due to either the change in the training scheme or the change in the features
of the contract, such as the introduction of a minimum floor to apprentices’ wages, which determined an
increase in the average wage relative to the Pacchetto Treu and to the external wage structure of other
comparable temporary workers. We could argue that since apprentices were hired at a higher wage in the
new apprenticeship regime than in the old regime, after graduation, these workers would have been reluctant
to stay in the same firm and accept a lower wage. Thus, the increase in the reservation wage of young
people starting an apprenticeship after the Biagi reform might have produced a downward rigidity in wage
formation for stayers. This effect may partially mask the larger wage loss for ‘new’ apprentices switching
to other firms, compared to graduates under the old scheme. The rise in the internal wage structure of the
apprentices relative to the external wage structure of temporary workers might plausibly have also affected
the intensity of their utilisation by employers. For example, the wage compensation could have translated
into reducing working time to keep labour cost under control.
To account for these different sources of variation, in the next analysis, we single out a double effect: the
first one is due to the change in the terms of the contract that impacts on the outcome variables of workers
during apprenticeship and then keeps influencing their behaviour after graduation; the second one is the
‘pure’ effect of training and firm-specific human capital accumulation.
Table 5 summarises the results from a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation that assesses the whole
effect of the change in the apprenticeship regime on the three variables of interest. The average treatment
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effect (ATE), estimated with the DID, is the parameter that allows us to distinguish the causal impact of the
policy change for those that have been ‘treated’ by the new apprenticeship relative to the hypothetical case
in which they did not receive the treatment and were hired under the old scheme. The estimation is run by
applying an augmented inverse probability weighting (AIPW) model, described in d’Agostino et al. (2018).
At the bottom of the table, we report the potential outcome, which represents the level of the variable in
the absence of treatment.
The structure of Table 5 is organised in three vertical blocks reporting our outcome variables, i.e., annual
earnings, annual weeks worked and weekly wages, for the three samples of graduates used in the previous
analysis, i.e., the full sample, the within-sector sample and the across-sectors sample. The first block shows
that when annual earnings are accounted for, we do not find any significant difference between ‘old’ and
‘new’ apprentices. In contrast, the two remaining blocks show that the apprentices treated by the Biagi Law
experience a decrease in weeks worked of 9% and an increase in weekly wages of almost the same amount
during the apprenticeship period. This result may be explained by the fact that the Biagi Law increased
the internal structure of apprentice wages as a compensation for the removal of the investment in general
training. This may have induced the training firm to reduce the working time of trainees to counterbalance
the higher wage paid to them relative to the external structure of wages that was valid for other types of
similar young workers. Moreover, our result is invariant across the samples of graduates. The DID result
implies that the differences in the outcome variables between ‘old’ and ‘new’ apprentices have triggered
lasting effects on the behaviour of these variables after graduation.
Figure 4 plots the marginal effects of mobility for graduates with the Biagi apprenticeship scheme, in
comparison to graduates with the Pacchetto Treu scheme. We restrict the analysis and consider only the
effect after one and three years after graduation. As the new apprenticeship has been gradually implemented
since 2005, we cannot consider the effect on the employees that we follow, at least, the first five years in
employment after graduation from apprenticeship up to the last available individual observationbecause of
the lack of sufficient observations on treated workers.
Figure 4 (panel a) shows marked differences in annual earnings before and after the Biagi reform. At
the aggregate level, graduates with the old apprenticeship scheme experience losses in annual earnings of
approximately 9% after switching jobs. Differently, switching jobs implies a loss in annual earnings of
approximately 24% for graduates with the new apprenticeship scheme. Again, this result is invariant across
samples.
As in the previous case, we split the factors behind the earnings dynamic in two components, one ascrib-
able to annual weeks worked and the other to weekly wages. Considering the annual weeks worked variable
(panel b), the negative difference between stayers and leavers is approximately 6% under the Pacchetto Treu
apprenticeship scheme and approximately 14% after the introduction of the Biagi Law, with no significant
difference across samples. In contrast, in terms of weekly wages (panel c), under the Pacchetto Treu, very
small differences emerge between stayers and firm switchers (approximately 3%), whereas after the policy
change, switchers suffer on average a loss of 10% in the full sample and approximately 17% in the within-
sector and across-sectors samples. This result shows that in the old apprenticeship regime, graduates can
quit and be hired by another firm, incurring just a small cost of mobility that is likely due to some frictions
in the labour market (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999b; Leuven, 2005). In contrast, in the new regime
mobility losses are substantial.
By jointly considering the results in Table 5 and Figure 4 and analysing the average effect starting from
one year from graduation, we obtain further useful insights. In fact, part of the difference in the performance
of the mobility of ‘old’ and ‘new’ graduates may be explained with the variation that emerges from the DID
analysis and that is due to the change in the apprenticeship regime over time. To disentangle the effect of
the change in contractual terms from the ‘pure’ effect of training, we decompose the marginal effect of ‘new’
graduates, and we compare it to the marginal effect of ‘old’ graduates. Table 6 reports these marginal effects
for annual weeks worked and weekly wages. We omit annual earnings since we do not find any significant
result in the DID analysis for this outcome.
Table 6 indicates that job switching leads to a loss in annual weeks worked in almost the same terms
for the ‘new’ graduates and ‘old’ graduates when we consider the ‘pure’ training effect. As in the previous
analysis, we attribute this result to a drop in weeks worked in comparison to stayers, and the reason lies in
some frictions causing a cost of mobility for graduates who quit the training firms. However, interpreting the
additional change in the weeks worked engendered by the revised contractual terms (approximately -9% in
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Figure 4: Biagi Law, marginal effects
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(c) Weekly wages
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all the samples) is challenging. To provide a tentative explanation of this result, we need the complementary
evidence on the pattern of wages.
When we analyse weekly wages, the difference between stayers and leavers that can be ascribable to the
wage floor is approximately 8.5%, whereas the difference related to the ‘pure’ training effect is only 1.4%
in the full sample. Interestingly, the gain for stayers that we can attribute to the firm-specific training
scheme introduced by the Biagi reform is almost the same order of magnitude of the one that we observe for
stayers who were treated with the Pacchetto Treu scheme, which combined general and firm-specific training.
Disaggregating the analysis by the type of job switchers yields a more comprehensive story. After the Biagi
Law, the emergence of the gain for stayers related to the contractual terms for both samples is approximately
8%, and the gain related to the training component is approximately 8% for the within-sector sample and
nearly 9% for the across-sectors sample. Comparing this result with the pattern of weekly wages for ‘old’
apprentices (first column of Table 6), we find that in this last case, graduates who move within sector do
not show significant differences with stayers, whereas for across-sectors firm-switchers, the effect of mobility
on weekly wages is a loss of approximately 3%. This result means that relative to the apprenticeship scheme
designed by the Pacchetto Treu, the Biagi Law determined a more pronounced loss in firm-specific skills of
within-sector switchers, worsening the disparities in the outcomes of otherwise similar graduates.
To explain why stayers show a gain in both wages and weeks worked in comparison to job switchers, we
argue that firm-specific skills make graduates more productive in the training firm, justifying their higher
labour cost and working time relative to graduates moving outside. Beyond the effect of training, we recall
that the Biagi Law allowed the firm to hire the apprentice at a lower level of the effective professional
classification (livello di inquadramento), implying a ‘de facto’ lower wage with respect to the formal wage
floor. We speculate that the lower effective wage offset the introduction of the wage floor and the risen cost
of labour, entailing a higher payoff accruing to the firm for a given number of weeks worked. Conversely,
job switchers would be employed in the new job at the formal lower professional status, undertaking the
corresponding tasks at a fairly consistent lower wage and shorter working time relative to stayers. This claim
is coherent with the study of Devicienti et al. (2018), showing that a large proportion of the growth in wage
dispersion in Italy over the period considered in our analysis occurred between job titles defined by collective
bargaining institutions.
Table 6: Biagi Law versus Pacchetto Treu, marginal effects
Pacchetto Treu Biagi Law
Marginal effect Marginal effect Marginal effect Marginal effect
contract terms pure training
Annual weeks worked
Full sample -0.063 *** -0.137 *** -0.093 *** -0.044 ***
Within-sector sample -0.061 *** -0.147 *** -0.089 *** -0.058 ***
Across-sectors sample -0.065 *** -0.163 *** -0.096 *** -0.067 ***
Weekly wages
Full sample -0.025 *** -0.099 *** -0.085 *** -0.014 ***
Within-sector sample -0.004 -0.166 *** -0.086 *** -0.080 ***
Across-sector sample -0.031 *** -0.171 *** -0.084 *** -0.087 ***
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors (10,000 replications) are in parentheses. The asterisks stand for the
p-value significance levels (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
Overall, we interpret these results as evidence in support of the hypothesis that the mix of firm-specific
and general training provided by the old regime allowed apprentices to accumulate some general human
capital that could be transferable to other jobs. Regarding the structure of incentives under the Pacchetto
Treu, the costs and returns of the general component of training were shared between training firms and
apprentices. Following the theoretical literature (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999b; Leuven, 2005), this
hints that firms might provide general training according to the expected payoffs.
In contrast, the scheme introduced by the Biagi Law narrowed the training opportunities and deepened
the lock-in effect of the apprentice with the training firm. Given that the new contract features have not
incentivised long-term attachment in training firms, the Biagi Law regime has reduced the bargaining power
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of former apprentices versus the initial employer. Therefore, the new apprenticeship has increased the
workers’ loss in the case of job mobility, while it has ensured that the training firm can fully capture the
advantages of the contract in terms of both the subsidisation of the hiring costs and the rents from the
investment in specific human capital. We can conclude that the Biagi reform has weakened the effectiveness
of the training scheme in delivering transferable skills to the apprentices and has contributed to increasing
inequality in terms of work intensity and pay among otherwise similar young workers and, quite conceivably,
among those within the same occupation.
5.3. Heterogeneous effects: firm size
Albanese et al. (2017) detect that firm size is an important variable in determining the effects of the new
apprenticeship contract on the outcomes of apprentices relative to the counterfactual case in which they would
have been hired under the old apprenticeship regime. Indeed, they show that ‘new’ apprentices hired by
firms above the 10-employee threshold have a higher chance of working in a permanent job after graduation.
One explanation of the worse performance of the reform in smaller firms is the lack of their capabilities to
undertake training investments. However, Albanese et al. (2017) also stress that the Biagi Law introduced
a higher tax rebate for firms just below the 10-employee threshold, thus incentivising smaller firms to churn
to avoid increasing the size of their permanent staff and triggering the loss of eligibility requirements.
As heterogeneity by firm size is a policy relevant issue, to complete our understanding, we replicate
the ‘before’ and ‘after’ Biagi Law comparison by distinguishing the two samples of firms below and above
the 10-employee threshold and investigate whether the mobility of graduates differently affects our outcome
variables. We discuss only the aggregate results to better highlight the major differences in the impact of
mobility in small and large firms rather than analyse each effect fully. Appendix C reports a summary of
the complete findings, disaggregating the contractual terms effect and the ‘pure’ effect of training. Similar
to the previous analysis, Figure 5 and Figure 6 plot the marginal effects of mobility of graduates with the
Biagi apprenticeship scheme compared to graduates with the Pacchetto Treu scheme for smaller and larger
firms, respectively.
Considering smaller firms (below the 10-employee threshold), we find a significant negative result for the
marginal effect of the Biagi reform on annual earnings (Figure 5 panel a), which is in line with the estimates
outlined in Figure 4. Differently, Figure 5 (panel b) shows that the policy change brought about a larger loss
in the work time of job switchers compared to stayers (approximately 22%) and that this result is driven by
the difference occurring across economic sectors since the result for within-sector switchers is not significant
at the conventional 5% level. Note that the loss in the number of the annual weeks worked for job switchers
was almost 9% under the Pacchetto Treu apprenticeship scheme invariantly across samples.
Even more telling is the pattern depicted by Figure 5 (panel c), showing that after the Biagi Law, no
significant difference between stayers and job switchers emerges when weekly wages are analysed. This
result is not striking, given the peculiar Italian industrial context, because it possibly reflects the lack of
effective opportunity for training and technologically specific human capital accumulation for the apprentices
in smaller firms, which implies that the productivity of workers does not vary whether they remain in the
same firm after training or switch employers. Moreover, the fact that we do not find any differential effect
on wages ascribable to the contract terms might indicate the vulnerability of workers vis-a´-vis employers in
the training firm, as well as outside, and the consequent loss of the tenure premium related to the minimum
wage.
In light of this result, the wide difference in working time between stayers and switchers shows that the
cost of mobility is entirely paid in a non-wage way. However, as we do not find any differential effect in
productivity (as proxied by weekly wages), the remarkable gap in work time between stayers and graduates
quitting the initial employer might partially conceal the fact that the ‘new’ graduates can be hired in the
training firm at a lower level of their effective professional position, as claimed for the aggregate sample of
firms. Hence, as their labour can result underpaid relative to the tasks they undertake, it is conceivable that
the working time for stayers is longer than that for switchers.
Looking at the pattern of the outcome variables that show the effects of mobility of graduates in larger
firms (above the 10-employee threshold), the picture changes drastically. In this case, graduates with the
Biagi Law apprenticeship scheme, after switching jobs, experience a loss in annual earnings of approximately
20% (Figure 6 panel a) and a loss in weekly wages of approximately 15% (Figure 6 panel c), with no
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Figure 5: Biagi Law, marginal effects in smaller training firms
Pacchetto Treu apprenticeship scheme                                                                         Biagi apprenticeship scheme
-
0.
60
-
0.
50
-
0.
40
-
0.
30
-
0.
20
-
0.
10
0.
00
0.
10
Full sample   Within-sector sample  Across-sectors sample    Full sample   Within-sector sample   Across-sectors sample  
A1
1 year effect 3 years effect 
(a) Annual earnings
Pacchetto Treu apprenticeship scheme                                                                         Biagi apprenticeship scheme
-
0.
50
-
0.
40
-
0.
30
-
0.
20
-
0.
10
0.
00
0.
10
Full sample   Within-sector sample  Across-sectors sample    Full sample   Within-sector sample   Across-sectors sample  
A1
1 year effect 3 years effect 
(b) Annual weeks worked
Pacchetto Treu apprenticeship scheme                                                                         Biagi apprenticeship scheme
-
0.
30
-
0.
20
-
0.
10
0.
00
0.
10
0.
20
             Full sample Within-sector sample Across-sectors sample Full sample Within-sector sample Across-sectors sample
A1
1 year effect 3 years effect 
(c) Weekly wages
18
Figure 6: Biagi Law, marginal effects in larger training firms
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significant variation across samples. This result shows that apprentices in larger firms do acquire some
technologically firm-specific skills.
Regarding the marginal effects of mobility on the number of weeks worked during a year in larger firms
(Figure 6 panel b), a noticeable heterogeneity emerges in comparison to smaller firms. Indeed, the difference
between stayers and switchers for this outcome is negligible under the Pacchetto Treu scheme (4.6%), and
it is not significant under the Biagi scheme. The fact that in larger firms, the time of work is similar for
apprentices and graduates hired with a permanent job, in the same firm and outside the training firm, is likely
to reflect that, first, large firms do use the apprenticeship contract with the purpose of investing in the human
capital of young workers more than to exploit apprentices as cheap labour, and second, potential frictions due
to informational asymmetries are strongly reduced in the case of turnover among large firms. This further
inspection suggests that after the liberalisation of the content of training and the change in the contract
terms applied with the Biagi reform, small firms have increasingly used apprentices as mere substitutes for
a temporary and cheap labour force to adjust to the business cycle instead of considering their recruitment
as a long-term investment decision. Thus, this heterogeneity analysis corroborates the argument that the
new arrangements introduced to increase flexibility in the use of apprentices have ultimately weakened
the potential positive effects of the contract on young workers’ outcomes, with the side-effect of widening
inequalities in the distribution of the gains between firms and trained workers and across similar workers, in
comparison to the counterfactual of the Pacchetto Treu scheme.
5.4. Robustness analysis
To complete the analysis, we first propose a placebo experiment that replicates the main estimation using
a sample of workers entering the labour market through a fixed-term contract instead of the apprenticeship.
Indeed, as described in Section 2, the fixed-term and apprenticeship contracts are the two most popular
typologies of temporary work in Italy, with the main difference in the mandatory provision of training, which
is established only for apprentices. The placebo experiment is aimed at investigating whether the results
obtained from the previous empirical analysis are due to the effect of the accumulation of human capital
through the training provided by apprenticeship or are due to some external—and unobserved—components.
Table 7: Placebo experiment estimates
Annual earnings Annual weeks worked Weekly wages
1 yr. 3 yr. 5 yr. 1 yr. 3 yr. 5 yr. 1 yr. 3 yr. 5 yr.
Full sample
Job switch -0.138 *** -0.105 *** -0.021 -0.119 *** -0.096 *** -0.045 *** -0.015 -0.005 0.024
(0.041) (0.035) (0.030) (0.022) (0.017) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 2447.342 2484.390 2375.469 2442.713 2478.512 2374.684 2442.713 2478.512 2374.684
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 334.626 566.546 632.109 332.231 560.715 630.087 332.231 560.715 630.087
No. of observations 13,365 12,574 11,346 13,347 12,558 11,337 13,347 12,558 11,337
Within-sector sample
Job switch -0.134 ** -0.092 * -0.028 -0.131 *** -0.088 *** -0.043 ** -0.007 -0.007 0.011
(0.053) (0.051) (0.043) (0.035) (0.025) (0.021) (0.031) (0.034) (0.035)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 1358.597 1331.222 1258.689 1358.327 1330.376 1259.055 1358.327 1330.376 1259.055
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 206.177 306.974 298.124 206.590 307.572 297.972 206.590 307.572 297.972
No. of observations 8,947 8,398 7,617 8,938 8,390 7,611 8,938 8,390 7,611
Across-sectors sample
Job switch -0.155 *** -0.116 *** -0.017 -0.127 *** -0.104 *** -0.048 *** -0.020 -0.005 0.034
(0.046) (0.039) (0.036) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 1851.699 1907.060 1830.951 1846.843 1901.386 1830.190 1846.843 1901.386 1830.190
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 281.796 454.321 497.391 280.428 451.821 497.398 280.428 451.821 497.398
No. of observations 11,134 10,451 9,369 11,117 10,436 9,361 11,117 10,436 9,361
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. The asterisks stand for the p-value significance levels (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). The sum of the observations
used in the within-sector sample and in the across-sectors sample are not equal to the sum of the observations used for the full-sample analysis, since the information on the stayers in
the same firm after graduation is repeated across the sub-samples.
Table 7 reports the main results of the experiment, using the same structure proposed in Table 2, 3 and
4. Throughout the three different samples, we find significant results only for the outcome variables weeks
worked and annual earnings. In contrast, no significant result emerges regarding weekly wages. Hence, the
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fixed-term contract affects the young employees’ work time after placement in a permanent contract, but it
does not impact on their human capital. Furthermore, the impact on earnings is only temporary. This result
suggests that the proposed instrumental variable approach is suitable to remove the self-selection bias from
the assessment of the impact of apprenticeship on our outcome variables.
Second, we propose a replication of the analysis on the heterogeneous effects by firm size in Section 5.3
by using a different threshold for smaller and larger firms as a robustness check. More specifically, during the
observed period, the legislation envisaged size-contingent firing restrictions according to which firing costs
increased sharply above the 15-employee threshold. Bratti et al. (2018) use this threshold to provide causal
evidence on the effect of EPL on firm-provided training by running a regression discontinuity design (RDD).
This study finds that larger firms made more extensive use of temporary workers who are less protected
by the legislation and that the higher worker turnover reduced the number of trained workers. Thus, we
might expect that the threshold of higher EPL would differently affect the training provision to incumbent
apprentices in firms below and above it and, in turn, would influence the impact of mobility of graduates
on the pattern of the outcome variables. We refer to for the results of this robustness check. Comparing
these estimates with the results presented in Section 5.3, we find that the effects of mobility are markedly
heterogeneous by the size of firms, with no significant difference between the two thresholds for the number
of employees.
Finally, we replicate the comparative analysis of the marginal effect of mobility under the old and new
apprenticeship scheme, proposed in Figure 4, by restricting the sample to the workers in the age range 18-26
years who entered the labour market with an apprenticeship contract. Indeed, the Pacchetto Treu restricted
the use of the apprenticeship contract to young workers in the age range 15-26 years, whereas the vocational
apprenticeship, which is largely the most used typology after the introduction of the Biagi Law, involves
young workers in the age range 18-29 years. As a consequence, in this robustness check, we consider a more
homogeneous group of workers eligible for the apprenticeship contract under the two different schemes. As
shown in the figure presented in Appendix E, the results do not change when we use this age range.
6. Conclusions
Using a new longitudinal dataset for Italy, this paper extends the approach of Fitzenberger et al. (2015)
and provides causal estimates of the effects of mobility after graduation of apprentices on three outcome
variables, viz. annual earnings, annual weeks worked and weekly wages. From this analysis, we infer how the
training provision impacts on skills and human capital of apprentices and whether apprenticeship training is
sufficiently general to be valuable to other firms within the same economic sector or across sectors. We adopt
an instrumental variable approach, exploiting time and regional variation of labour market characteristics
to control for selection bias and confounding factors. A related issue that we empirically investigate is the
effect of the Biagi Law, which liberalised the training scheme and revised some features of the apprenticeship
contract terms. To this aim, we assess the causal impact of the new apprenticeship on the selected outcome
variables, in comparison to the counterfactual of the old apprenticeship regime established by the Pacchetto
Treu. From this analysis, we infer the differential effect of a scheme based on general and specific training
(the old apprenticeship) versus a scheme based only on specific training (the new apprenticeship).
Using the stayers as the comparison group, we find that job switchers who changed economic sectors faced
a significant reduction in both wages and intensity of work supplied and performed worse than job switchers
who remained in the same sector of the training firm, indicating a loss of firm-specific human capital. In
addition, our findings suggest that the arrangements of the training scheme set by the Biagi reform have
further reduced the transferability of skills of graduates from apprenticeship. Allowing for heterogeneity by
firm size, this study shows large differences in the patterns of the outcome variables for graduates under
the new regime, with workers employed in smaller firms standing out as the least privileged. This result
is compatible with the hypothesis that after the labour market deregulation implemented with the Biagi
reform, the training provision delivered by small firms has been inadequate.
From the perspective of the impact on labour market equality, our estimates show the following: first,
significant disparities among graduates from apprenticeship have emerged in terms of work intensity and pay,
and second, these disparities have increased after the liberalisation of the contract introduced by the Biagi
Law. Overall, the evidence provided by our analysis suggests that the spread of the apprenticeship contract
in Italy over the last twenty years might have contributed to increasing the labour earnings inequality among
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similar young workers. This result is particularly relevant to understanding possible mechanisms driving the
emergence of within inequalities in the Italian labour market.
The policy implication drawn from the empirical analysis proposed in this paper is that training policies
in Italy should be entirely reformed to improve both efficiency and equity. In addition, our findings on
the revision of the apprenticeship contract may serve as a paradigmatic assessment that casts doubts on the
effectiveness of measures only aimed at liberalising the labour market to improve its functioning. In contrast,
our analysis seems to underpin the view that leashing market forces within appropriate institutional settings
and taking corrective measures for unacceptable inequalities would be preferable policy choices to cope with
the unfolding issues in contemporary labour markets.
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics
Stayers Within-sector Across-sectors Total
switchers switchers
Outcome variables
Annual earnings (log) 9.877 9.762 9.81 9.832
Annual weeks worked (log) 3.905 3.819 3.839 3.865
Weekly wages (log) 5.976 5.947 5.976 5.971
Main covariates
Gender
Male 54.490 52.552 57.083 55.189
Female 45.510 47.448 42.917 44.811
Age 26.938 27.611 27.71 27.351
Education
Primary 26.153 34.188 27.731 28.092
Secondary 61.119 55.195 58.519 59.127
Tertiary 12.729 10.618 13.750 12.781
Occupation
Blue collar 38.454 34.640 39.882 38.387
White collar 61.546 65.360 60.118 61.613
Apprenticeship average weekly wage (log) 5.655 5.585 5.54 5.598
Term of the apprenticeship (total weeks worked) 209.606 155.7 117.494 164.626
Part-time
no 88.218 83.379 83.218 85.462
yes 11.782 16.621 16.782 14.538
Maternity leave
no 98.616 98.314 98.568 98.547
yes 1.384 1.686 1.432 1.453
Job suspension allowance
no 99.426 99.727 99.351 99.446
yes 0.574 0.273 0.649 0.554
Biagi Law
no 89.635 91.067 91.753 90.701
yes 10.365 8.933 8.247 9.299
Firm type
Main firm 1.435 4.786 5.660 3.642
Secondary 7.582 8.706 17.208 11.539
Single firm 90.983 86.509 77.132 84.819
Firm size 258.508 529.782 1786.912 995.992
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Appendix B. OLS estimates
Annual earnings Annual weeks worked Weekly wage
1 yr. 3 yr. 5 yr. 1 yr. 3 yr. 5 yr. 1 yr. 3 yr. 5 yr.
Full sample
Job switch -0.077 *** -0.073 *** -0.081 *** -0.062 *** -0.058 *** -0.061 *** -0.018 * -0.018 * -0.019 *
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
R2 0.367 0.360 0.376 0.123 0.112 0.104 0.523 0.518 0.531
Adjusted R2 0.363 0.356 0.373 0.119 0.108 0.099 0.520 0.516 0.529
No. of observations 13225 12764 11600 13214 12754 11596 13214 12754 11596
Within-sector sample
Job switch -0.044 ** -0.046 ** -0.060 *** -0.051 *** -0.051 *** -0.056 *** 0.004 0.001 -0.002
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
R2 0.383 0.370 0.381 0.124 0.113 0.097 0.552 0.540 0.545
Adjusted R2 0.378 0.364 0.375 0.116 0.105 0.088 0.548 0.536 0.541
No. of observations 8054 7656 6771 8048 7650 6770 8048 7650 6770
Across-sectors sample
Job switch -0.083 *** -0.075 *** -0.087 *** -0.065 *** -0.058 *** -0.062 *** -0.023 * -0.022 * -0.024 *
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
R2 0.372 0.367 0.392 0.120 0.111 0.105 0.525 0.522 0.536
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.363 0.388 0.114 0.105 0.099 0.522 0.519 0.532
No. of observations 11044 10655 9663 11035 10647 9660 11035 10647 9660
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The asterisks stand for the p-value significance levels (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). The
sums of the observations used in the within-sector sample and in the across-sectors sample are not equal to the sum of the observations used for the full-sample
analysis since the information on the stayers in the same firm after graduation is repeated across the sub-samples.
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Appendix C. Heterogeneous effects by firm size (10-employee threshold), marginal effects
Table C.1: Difference-in-Differences estimates
Annual earnings Annual weeks worked Weekly wages
Full Within-sector Across-sectors Full Within-sector Across-sectors Full Within-sector Across-sectors
sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample
Smaller training firms
ATE -0.031 -0.022 -0.033 -0.112 *** -0.105 *** -0.115 *** 0.079 *** 0.081 *** 0.080 ***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Potential outcome 8.914 *** 8.911 *** 8.913 *** 3.452 *** 3.450 *** 3.452 *** 5.464 *** 5.463 *** 5.463 ***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
No. of observations 5792 5728 5752 5791 5727 5751 5791 5727 5751
Larger training firms
ATE 0.024 0.024 0.024 -0.060 ** -0.060 * -0.059 * 0.083 *** 0.083 *** 0.082 ***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Potential outcome 9.155 *** 9.153 *** 9.152 *** 3.509 *** 3.509 *** 3.507 *** 5.646 *** 5.644 *** 5.646 ***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
No. of observations 3530 3474 3497 3530 3474 3497 3529 3473 3496
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. The asterisks stand for the p-value significance levels (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). The sum of
the observations used in the within-sector sample and in the across-sectors sample are not equal to the sum of the observations used for the full-sample analysis, since the
information on the stayers in the same firm after graduation is repeated across the sub-samples.
Table C.2: Biagi Law versus Pacchetto Treu, marginal effects
Pacchetto Treu Biagi Law
Marginal effect Marginal effect Marginal effect Marginal effect
contract terms pure training
Smaller training firms
Annual weeks worked
Full sample -0.080 *** -0.226 ** -0.112 *** -0.114 ***
Within-sector sample -0.074 *** -0.157 * -0.105 *** -0.052 *
Across-sector sample -0.088 *** -0.314 *** -0.125 *** -0.189 ***
Larger training firms
Weekly wages
Full sample -0.019 ** -0.148 *** -0.083 *** -0.065 ***
Within-sector sample 0.026 ** -0.162 *** -0.083 *** -0.079 ***
Across-sector sample -0.032 *** -0.226 *** -0.082 *** -0.144 ***
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors (10,000 replications) are in parentheses. The asterisks stand for the
p-value significance levels (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
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Appendix D. Heterogeneous effects by firm size (15-employee threshold), marginal effects
Figure D.1: Biagi Law, marginal effects in smaller training firms
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Figure D.2: Biagi Law, marginal effects in larger training firms
-
0.
40
-
0.
30
-
0.
20
-
0.
10
0.
00
Full sample   Within-sector sample  Across-sectors sample    Full sample   Within-sector sample   Across-sectors sample  
A1
1 year effect 3 years effect 
(a) Annual earnings
-
0.
20
-
0.
15
-
0.
10
-
0.
05
0.
00
0.
05
Full sample   Within-sector sample  Across-sectors sample    Full sample   Within-sector sample   Across-sectors sample  
A1
1 year effect 3 years effect 
(b) Annual weeks worked
-
0.
30
-
0.
20
-
0.
10
0.
00
0.
10
             Full sample Within-sector sample Across-sectors sample Full sample Within-sector sample Across-sectors sample
A1
1 year effect 3 years effect 
(c) Weekly wages
27
Appendix E. Heterogeneous effects by age range (18-26 years old)
Figure E.1: Biagi Law, marginal effects in the 18-26 years old age group
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